JAN 2000

SUPREME COURT FINDS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ARE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED . . . . .

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-SALAZAR (98-1255)

Find on Web at Cornell University: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1255.ZS.html

Argued November 29, 1999 -- Decided January 19, 2000

Opinion author: Ginsburg

Respondent Martinez-Salazar and a codefendant were charged with a variety of federal offenses. As the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instruct, the District Court allotted them 10 peremptory challenges exercisable jointly in the selection of 12 jurors, Rule 24(b), and another such challenge exercisable in the selection of an alternate juror, Rule 24(c). Because prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, the codefendants challenged him for cause, but the District Court declined to excuse him. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove Gilbert. The codefendants subsequently exhausted all of their peremptory challenges.

At the conclusion of the trial, Martinez-Salazar was convicted on all counts. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with him (and the Government here does not contest) that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. This error, the Ninth Circuit held, did not violate the Sixth Amendment, because Gilbert was removed and the impartiality of the jury eventually seated was not challenged. But the Court of Appeals further concluded that the District Court's mistake resulted in a violation of Martinez-Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, thereby impairing his right to the full complement of peremptory challenges to which federal law entitled him. Such an error, the Court of Appeals held, requires automatic reversal. Held: A defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 24 is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Pp. 5-12.

(a) Although the peremptory challenge plays an important role in reinforcing a defendant's constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury, see, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-213, 218-219, this Court has long recognized that such challenges are auxiliary; unlike the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension, see, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88.

(b) Ross dealt with a state-law question resembling the one presented here. This Court first rejected the Ross defendant's position that, without more, the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. 487 U.S., at 88. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the Court held, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated. Ibid. The Court then rejected the defendant's due process objection that forced use of a peremptory challenge to cure a trial court's error in denying a challenge for cause arbitrarily deprived him of the full complement of peremptory challenges allowed under Oklahoma law. Id., at 89.

In choosing to remove Gilbert rather than taking his chances on appeal, Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge. Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOME ===============================================================

ANDERS PROCEDURE IS NOT THE ONLY WAY TO RECONCILE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NOT SPENDING MONEY ON FRIVOLOUS APPEALS AND DEFENDANTS' INTEREST IN COUNSELED APPEALS.

SMITH v. ROBBINS (98-1037)

Find the entire decision on the Web at Cornell Law: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1037.ZS.html

Argued October 5, 1999 -- Decided January 19, 2000

Opinion author: Thomas

An attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant on appeal may conclude that an appeal would be frivolous and request that the appellate court allow him to withdraw or that the court dispose of the case without the filing of merits briefs. In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, this Court found that, in order to protect a defendant's constitutional right to appellate counsel, courts must safeguard against the risk of granting such requests where an appeal is not actually frivolous; found California's procedure for evaluating such requests inadequate; and set forth an acceptable procedure.

California adopted a new procedure in People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071. Unlike under the Anders procedure, counsel under Wende neither explicitly states that his review has led him to conclude that an appeal would be frivolous nor requests to withdraw; instead he is silent on the merits of the case and offers to brief issues at the court's direction. A California state-court jury convicted respondent Robbins of second-degree murder and grand theft. His appointed counsel on appeal concluded that appeal would be frivolous and filed with the State Court of Appeal a brief that complied with the Wende procedure.

Agreeing with counsel's assessment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review.

After exhausting his state postconviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas relief, arguing, inter alia, that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel's Wende brief did not comply with the Anders requirement that the brief refer "to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal," 386 U.S., at 744.

The District Court agreed, concluding that there were at least two issues that might arguably have supported Robbins's appeal and finding that his counsel's failure to include them in his brief deviated from the Anders procedure and thus amounted to deficient performance by counsel. Rather than requiring Robbins to prove prejudice from this deficiency, the court applied a presumption of prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding that Anders, together with Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353--which held that States must provide appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants on appeal--set forth the exclusive procedure by which appointed counsel's performance could be constitutional, and that counsel's brief failed to comply with that procedure. The court, however, remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins. Held: 1. The Anders procedure is only one method of satisfying the Constitution's requirements for indigent criminal appeals; the States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel. Pp. 6-13.

(b) The Ninth Circuit erred in finding that Anders's final section, though unnecessary to the holding in that case, was obligatory upon the States. This Court has never so held; its precedents suggest otherwise; and the Ninth Circuit's view runs contrary to this Court's established practice. In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, this Court rejected a challenge to Wisconsin's variation on the Anders procedure, even though that variation, in at least one respect, provided less effective advocacy for an indigent. In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, the Court explained that the Anders procedure is not an independent constitutional command, but rather a prophylactic framework; it did not say that this was the only framework that could adequately vindicate the right to appellate counsel announced in Douglas. 2. California's Wende procedure does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 13-22. (a) The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas line of cases has never been explicitly stated, but this Court's case law reveals that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment largely converge to require that a State's procedure "afford adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants," Griffin, supra, at 20 (plurality opinion). A State's procedure provides such review so long as it reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. In determining whether a particular procedure satisfies this standard, it is important to focus on the underlying goals that the procedure should serve--to ensure that those indigents whose appeals are not frivolous receive the counsel and merits brief required by Douglas, and also to enable the State to "protect itself so that frivolous appeals are not subsidized and public moneys not needlessly spent," (b) The Wende procedure reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the appeal's merit. A comparison of that procedure to those evaluated in this Court's chief cases demonstrates that it affords indigents the adequate and effective appellate review required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Wende procedure is undoubtedly far better than those procedures the Court has found inadequate. A significant fact in finding the old California procedure inadequate in Anders, and also in finding inadequate the procedures that the Court reviewed in Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, and Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, two of the precedents on which the Anders Court relied, was that those procedures required only a determination that the defendant was

(c) The Wende procedure is also at least comparable to those procedures the Court has approved. By neither requiring the Wende brief to raise legal issues nor requiring counsel to explicitly describe the case as frivolous, California has made a good-faith effort to mitigate one of the problems that critics have found with Anders, namely, the requirement that counsel violate his ethical duty as an officer of the court (by presenting frivolous arguments) as well as his duty to further his client's interests (by characterizing the client's claims as frivolous). Wende also attempts to resolve another Anders problem--that it apparently adopts gradations of frivolity and uses two different meanings for the phrase "arguable issue"--by drawing the line at frivolity and by defining arguable issues as those that are not frivolous. 152 F.3d 1062, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOME

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-SALAZAR (98-1255) Find on Web at Cornell University: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1255.ZS.html Argued November 29, 1999 -- Decided January 19, 2000 Opinion author: Ginsburg Respondent Martinez-Salazar and a codefendant were charged with a variety of federal offenses. As the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instruct, the District Court allotted them 10 peremptory challenges exercisable jointly in the selection of 12 jurors, Rule 24(b), and another such challenge exercisable in the selection of an alternate juror, Rule 24(c). Because prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, the codefendants challenged him for cause, but the District Court declined to excuse him. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove Gilbert. The codefendants subsequently exhausted all of their peremptory challenges.

In choosing to remove Gilbert rather than taking his chances on appeal, Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge. Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury.

(e) Martinez-Salazar and his codefendant were accorded the exact number of peremptory challenges that federal law allowed; he cannot tenably assert any violation of his Fifth Amendment due process right. See Ross, 487 U.S., at 91. P. 12. 146 F.3d 653, reversed. =============================================================== SMITH v. ROBBINS (98-1037) Find the entire decision on the Web at Cornell Law: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-1037.ZS.html Argued October 5, 1999 -- Decided January 19, 2000 Opinion author: Thomas An attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant on appeal may conclude that an appeal would be frivolous and request that the appellate court allow him to withdraw or that the court dispose of the case without the filing of merits briefs. In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, this Court found that, in order to protect a defendant's constitutional right to appellate counsel, courts must safeguard against the risk of granting such requests where an appeal is not actually frivolous; found California's procedure for evaluating such requests inadequate; and set forth an acceptable procedure.

Agreeing with counsel's assessment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review.

HOME NEWSLETTERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOT LINKS

STATE V MILLER (La. 2001) holds that a pretext of "touching the fog line one time" is sufficient for investigatory stop and subsequent seizure of drugs. Reversing 2nd Circuit.

ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR (99-1132) holds that police may detain homeowner outside his home while securing a warrant. This is a "seizure" not prohbited by 5th Amendment.

In Dickerson v US, the Supreme Court declines to overrule Miranda, and finds a U.S. Statute seeking to do so is Unconstitutional. (Two dissents) Click on the links to reach full text at Cornell U.

In APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY the Court finds that Due Process requires a finding of racial motivation in a shooting case 'beyond a reasonable doubt', reigning in a trend that has allowed more and more sentencing enhancements by preponderance alone.

State v. Miller
Excerpt from: 2001 WL 1298827, *2 (La.) to 2001 WL 1298827, *3 (La.)

In the present case, the state trooper acted lawfully in stopping respondent after observing her cross the right-hand fog line of the highway. See State v. Waters, 00-0356, pp. 5-6 (La.3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056-57. Given the lawfulness of the initial stop, the reasonableness of the escalating encounter between respondent and the state trooper hinged on "whether the actions undertaken by the officer following the stop were reasonably responsive to the circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, as augmented by information gleaned by the officer during the stop." United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841, 119 S.Ct. ) 105, 142 L.Ed.2d 84 (1998).

The trooper testified at the suppression hearing that he stopped respondent for reasons of public safety without intending to issue her a citation. Nevertheless, the officer had the right to conduct a routine license and registration check and to engage respondent in conversation as he did so. State v. Lopez, 00-0562, p. 3 (La.10/30/00), 772 So.2d 90, 92- 93.
Respondent's nervous demeanor as she responded to the officer's questions and her unlikely explanation for the overnight trip in a car rented by an individual who had been arrested for possession of a substantial amount of marijuana led to a shift in the trooper's focus that was "neither unusual nor impermissible." Sowers, 136 F.3d at 27. The trooper immediately reported his deepening suspicions and Officer Thigpen, at home when he received his dispatcher's call, responded promptly, arriving with his dog on the scene 34 minutes later.

The stop was approaching an hour at this point but its duration reasonably correlated with the escalating level of suspicion as the officers pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel the trooper's suspicions without unnecessary delay. See United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir.1999) (50-minute investigatory stop reasonable: "[a] long duration ... does not by itself transform an otherwise valid stop into an arrest."); United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522,, 530 (1st Cir.1996)(75- minute investigatory stop reasonable: "there is no talismanic time beyond which any stop initially justified on the basis of Terry becomes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . . . . .

We also take into account here that physical intrusiveness of respondent's detention did not intensify as the duration of the stop expanded to accommodate the trooper's growing suspicions of criminal activity. The trooper refrained from handcuffing respondent and placing her in the back seat of his patrol unit, circumstances which might have suggested during the lengthening delay that a de facto arrest had taken place. . . . . .

Under these circumstances, the record fully supports the finding of the trial court that the officers diligently pursued their investigation and that the duration of the stop, although not brief, did not transform the encounter into a de facto arrest.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed, the judgement of the district court denying respondent's motion to suppress the evidence and her statements on the scene is reinstated, respondent's guilty plea and sentence are also reinstated, and this case is remanded to the district court for execution of sentence.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.
Case: State v. Miller
Excerpt from: 2001 WL 1298827, *2 (La.) to 2001 WL 1298827, *3 (La.)

HOME NEWSLETTERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOT LINKS

ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR (99-1132)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-1132.ZS.html

Argued November 1, 2000 -- Decided February 20, 2001
Opinion author: Breyer
===============================================================
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that respondent McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented him from entering the home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant. Once they did so, the officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested McArthur. He was subsequently charged with misdemeanor possession of those items. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter his home unaccompanied. The Illinois trial court granted the motion, and the State Appellate Court affirmed.

Held: Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3-10.
(a) The Amendment's central requirement is one of reasonableness. Although, in the ordinary case, personal property seizures are unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, there
are exceptions to this rule involving special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, and the like, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940-941. The circumstances here involve a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need. Cf., e.g., United States v. Place, supra, at 701. Moreover, the restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30, and avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585.

Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the Court must balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion here was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654. In light of the following circumstances, considered in combination, the Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and hence lawful. First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs. Second, they had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, he would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.

Third, they made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy by avoiding a warrantless entry or arrest and preventing McArthur only from entering his home unaccompanied. Fourth, they imposed the restraint for a limited period, which was no longer than reasonably necessary for them, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Pp. 3-6.
(b) The conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds significant support in this Court's case law. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796; United States v. Place, supra, at 706. And in no case has this Court held unlawful a
temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period. But cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754. Pp. 6-7.
(c) The Court is not persuaded by the countervailing considerations raised by the parties or lower courts: that the police proceeded without probable cause; that, because McArthur was on his porch, the police order that he stay outside his
home amounted to an impermissible "constructive eviction"; that an officer, with McArthur's consent, stepped inside the home's doorway to observe McArthur when McArthur reentered the home on two or three occasions; and that Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742, 754, offers direct support for McArthur's position. Pp. 7-10.

304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713 N. E. 2d 93, reversed and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

HOME NEWSLETTERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOT LINKS

DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES (99-5525)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-5525.ZS.html

Argued April 19, 2000 -- Decided June 26, 2000
Opinion author: Rehnquist

===============================================================

In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, in which the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence, id., at 479, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. sect. 3501 which in essence makes the admissibility of such statements turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily. Petitioner, under indictment for bank robbery and related federal crimes, moved to suppress a statement he had made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the ground he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated.

The District Court granted his motion, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings,
but held that sect. 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. It concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have
the final say on the admissibility question.

Held: Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Pp. 2-14.

(a) Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Given sect. 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and its instruction for trial courts to consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, this Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended sect. 3501 to overrule Miranda.

The law is clear as to whether Congress has constitutional authority to do so. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, e.g., Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-348, it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-521.

That Miranda announced a constitutional rule is demonstrated, first and foremost, by the fact that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied its rule to proceedings in state
courts, and that the Court has consistently done so ever since. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (per curiam).

The Court does not hold supervisory power over the state courts, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, as to which its authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the onstitution, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422. The conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is also supported by the fact that that case is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule, see, e.g., 384 U.S., at 445.

Although Miranda invited legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, it stated that any legislative alternative must be "at least as effective in appraising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it." Id., at 467.

A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court has subsequently made exceptions from the Miranda rule, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649. No constitutional rule is immutable, and the sort of refinements made by such cases are merely a normal part of constitutional law. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306--in which the Court,
in refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases, stated that Miranda's exclusionary rule serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than that Amendment itself--does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth.

Finally, although the Court agrees with the court-appointed amicus curiae that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were when Miranda was decided--e.g., a suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388--it does not agree that such additional measures supplement sect. 3501's protections sufficiently to create an adequate substitute for the Miranda warnings. Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and assure him that the exercise of that right
will be honored, see, e.g., 384 U.S., at 467, while sect. 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. Section 3501,
therefore, cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law. Pp. 2-12.

(b) This Court declines to overrule Miranda. Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now. Even in constitutional cases, stare decisis carries such persuasive force that the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification. E.g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp, 517 U.S. 843, 856.

There is no such justification here. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United States,
526 U.S. 314, 331-332. While the Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not happened to Miranda. If anything, subsequent cases have reduced Miranda's impact on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling. The rule's disadvantage is that it may result in
a guilty defendant going free. But experience suggests that sect. 3501's totality-of-the-circumstances test is more difficult than Miranda for officers to conform to, and for courts to apply consistently. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515.

The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not dispense with the voluntariness inquiry, but cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was compelled despite officers' adherence to Miranda are rare. Pp. 12-14.

166 F.3d 667, reversed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined.
HOME NEWSLETTERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOT LINKS

===============================================================
APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY (99-478)
Web-accessible at:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-478.ZS.html

Argued March 28, 2000 -- Decided June 26, 2000
Opinion author: Stevens

After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: The Constitution requires that any fact that increases   the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp.
7-31.
(a) The answer to the narrow constitutional question presented--whether Apprendi's sentence was permissible, given   that it exceeds the 10-year maximum for the offense
charged--was foreshadowed by the holding in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, that, with regard to federal law, the   Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial guarantees require that any fact other than prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,   and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer when a state statute is involved. Pp. 7-9.
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, taken together, entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364. The historical foundation for these principles extends down centuries into the common law.

While judges in this country have long exercised discretion in sentencing, such discretion is bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by the legislature. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447. The historic inseparability of verdict and judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion highlight the novelty of a scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that exposes the defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he could receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Pp. 9-18.
(c) McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, was the first case in which the Court used "sentencing factor" to refer to a fact that was not found by the jury but could affect the
sentence imposed by the judge. I n finding that the scheme at issue there did not run afoul of Winship's strictures, this Court did not budge from the position that (1) constitutional
limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense, id., at 85-88, and

(2) a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts exposing defendants to greater or additional punishment may raise serious constitutional concerns, id., at 88. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224--in which the Court upheld a federal law allowing a judge to impose an enhanced sentence   based on prior convictions not alleged in the   indictment--represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice. Pp. 19-24.
(d) In light of the constitutional rule expressed here, New Jersey's practice cannot stand. It allows a jury to   convict a defendant of a second-degree offense on its finding beyond a reasonable doubt and then allows a judge to impose punishment identical to that New Jersey provides for first-degree crimes on his finding, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant's purpose was to intimidate his victim based on the victim's particular characteristic. The   State's argument that the biased purpose finding is not an "element" of a distinct hate crime offense but a "sentencing factor" of motive is nothing more than a disagreement with the   rule applied in this case.

HOME NEWSLETTERS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HOT LINKS