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Trustees of Freedom
Dedicated to The Right to Counsel February 10, 1999 Vol. 7 No. 1


District Assistance Grants Lower

Second Round "Competitive"

The disbursements of FY 1999 DAF funds to district Defenders show a drop from an estimated 4 million dollars in 1997-98 to about

2.4 million dollars in 1999-2000. The other 1.6 million is expected to be disbursed on a competitive basis during the early part of calendar year 1999.

There may be some concern that small districts continue to run surplus in their general fund because the LIDAB is providing additional funding. It is axiomatic that running in the black means that the agency has more money than it needs.

In the larger districts, the additional challenge of Capital Litigation and serious felonies means that a disproportionate share of DAF goes to the urban areas.

Baton Rouge and New Orleans continue to face serious underfunding. Despite the fact that some Orleans Courts do not collect the maximum available Court Costs, LIDAB assistance is expected to be a part of the effort to save those programs.

                POST CONVICTION RELIEF ADDED TO

LIDAB PROGRAMS: LOYOLA CENTER

                                FACING END OF THE ROAD

The end of Federal Funding for post-conviction representation has the Loyola Death Penalty Resource Center sliding into oblivion, and LIDAB leaders are looking at trying to fill the void. In a letter to concerned leaders in the State Defender system, Nick Trenticosta indicates that his office "will not take any new state post-conviction cases". "It does not seem possible that this office can stay afloat ", says the memo, and Trenticosta notes that there does not appear to be any momentum toward State funding for such agencies.
At the same time, Jelpi Picou has filed an Amicus in the matter of State vs. Bourque, in St. Martin Parish. Bourque is on Death Row, and the issue appears to be whether there are any resources for collateral attack on the sentence.

In its filing, the LIDAB asserts that it " . . is a proper funding source for the expenses associated with capital post-conviction defense where counsel is appointed." The Amicus says LIDAB could fund the representation either by grant to the District Defender or by a "Capital Post-Conviction Program" administered and funded by LIDAB.

The brief relies on the mandate of R. S. 15:151.2(A), which authorizes it to provide funds when statutes provide the "right to counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases". The provision is taken to mean that when there is an indigent and the right to counsel, the LIDAB may step in.

Apparently, the Louisiana District Attorney's Association objects to the LIDAB becoming involved in post-conviction. The LIDAB is staking out the position that this kind of work is well within its mandate.

The Amicus also notes that the State Supreme Court has stepped back from involvement in the direct funding decisions and program work of the LIDAB. In State v Jones 97 1586 (La. 3/4/98) the Court noted that the LIDAB has to be left to work out the details on how funds are applied to Indigent Defense in the State.

Concerns for Local Boards

LaPDA has expressed its concern that much detail work is going on at the LIDAB: attorney vouchers are being paid, billing for experts is being reviewed and administered, and specific cases are being handled.

While the Districts remain, a second paralell structure is forming to handle certain kinds of litigation. Is this the birth of that "Statewide Board" under another banner? Does the trend eventually resolve into a situation where the District Program is handling only misdemeanors and traffic, and the State takes care of the big cases? These are things that Public Defenders must be concerned with, and the ultimate outcome is certainly up to only them.

LAPDA.ORG
INFORMATION ON THE WEB

If you have Internet Access, the LaPDA has a web site that includes all our recent newsletters, recent developments, politics, and other information. You are welcome to send us an E Mail with your comments on issues of the day.

We have included text of some of the most important recent decisions of the U.S. and Louisiana Supreme Court, and links to other places on the internet where you can find legal and other information.

In addition, there is a special "Louisiana Daubert" section. If you need information on how to apply the Daubert case dealing with scientific evidence, everything you need is on our site.

Any suggestions you have would be most welcome. You can click on the E Mail Address at the site and contact LaPDA directly.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

STATE V LARRY JOHNSON

97 kk 3149 (La. 11/ 13/98)

Defendant may be impeached by his testimony at a motion to suppress. C.Cr. Pro. Art. 703E.

It was not a 5th Amendment violation for him to waive silence so that a case of police coercion could be made out at the suppression hearing, and the State could therefore use his prior testimony in impeachment when he took the stand at trial.

STATE v ABRAHAM AYUSO

98 kk 0583 (La. 11/6/98)

CI would not be identified where he was less important than another CI who defendant did get. Court found Defendant did not show any evidence from CI was necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.

STATE V ROBERT LEE DUKE

97 K 3059 (La. 10/30/98)
Statute requires state to use inculpatory statements of defendant in the "entirety". 15:450. But where the state brought in details in rebuttal, and defendant was given opportunity to include additional parts, "rule of completeness" of 15:450 was met. This was true even if entire statement did not come in.
Court found the point of the statute was that the jury had to understand the tenor of the entire statement, and that the Govt. could not mislead by using only certain portions.

State v. Taylor

32,224     La.App. 2 Cir. 11/13/98

RAPE SHIELD could not prime Constitutional Right to impeach complaintant. The Second Circuit holds that even though questions involved prior sexual acts, State could not prevent the inquiry. Complaintant had told several different stories. The stories were brought up only to confirm the inconsistent nature of them and show a lack of credibility.

CONVICTION REVERSED:
Due to the judge's ruling, the jury was left with the incorrect impression that R.J. had only admitted having sex with the defendant. The record showed that R.J. made inconsistent statements in regards to her sexual behavior. As such, Taylor's right to present a defense was clearly compromised. We are constrained to find that barring the defendant from cross-examining R.J. about her prior inconsistent statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly since the state relied almost entirely on R. J.'s credibility and Taylor's only defense was the lack thereof. > La. C.C.P. art. 921; > State v. Fowlkes, 25,870 (La.App.2d Cir.3/30/90), 634 So.2d 953; see also, > State v. Ferdinand, 441 So.2d 1272 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied > 445 So.2d 1233 (La.1984). The court's ruling broadly foreclosed this critical element of impeachment, and therefore constitutes reversible error.

State v. Adkins

31,300 11/9/98, La.App. 2 Cir.,1998

Second follows Third to hold that R.S. 15:171 does not provide relief to defendants under the requirement of trial within six months.

This court... has specifically declined to adopt the conclusion that R.S. 15:171, which is obviously intended to benefit young victims of crimes, also confers the benefit of dismissal after six months lapse.

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